Selves into Persons: Another Legacy from John Dewey by Rucker, Darnell
SELVES INTO PERSONS: 
ANOTHER LEGACY FROM JOHN DEWEY 
by Darnell Rucker 
John Dewey opened his 1913 article on "Self" in A Cyclopedia of 
Education by saying of self that, as Augustine said of time, "Everybody 
knows what it is, but no one can tell."' And then he proceeded to tell. 
Yet Dewey knew that what he told was part of the story only, though he 
did not get around to filling i t  in until almost thirty years later; and, 
even then, so far as I know, he never completed i t .  
Dewey's insistence upon the thorough-going correlative nature of 
individual and society as a specification of his generic concept of 
organism-environment interaction does not need restatement to anyone 
familiar with his social philosophy. That concept has been persistently 
misinterpreted, of course, by a wide variety of critics, friendly and 
hostile, the misinterpretations usually resting on one or another version 
of the notion that human individuals have pre- or extra-social existence. 
The statement of the interaction appears over and over in Dewey's 
works, nowhere more succinctly than in The Public and its Problems, 
where he stated the ideal of democracy, which he sald is the ideal of 
community. He said of that ideal: 
From the standpo~nt of the ~ndlvidual, ~t conslsts In havlng a responr~ble share 
according to capacity in torm~ng and directing the ac t~vi t~er  of the groups to uhlch 
one belongs and In participating accord~ng to need in the values wh~ch the groups 
rustam. From the standpo~nt of the groups, 11 demands l~bera t~on  of the poten- 
tlalit~es o f  members of a group In harmony w ~ t h  the Interests and goodz which are 
common ' 
What this ideal does is point a direction for needed change in 
educational and political processes. What it means for the individual is a 
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world in which individuals function with individualized skills, interests, and 
purposes that are integral with socially recognized goods and share in those 
social values to which they contribute. What it means for the community is 
a coherent, flexible system of institutions so organized that it creates 
productive individuals, provides efficient channels for their productive 
activities, and makes available to individuals the values produced, all of this 
aimed at  the primary value of human growth, 
But while Dewey is concerned to eliminate the problem, inherited from 
an inadequate psychology, of how predetermined individuals can relate to 
each other and to society, his critics sometimes read into his account a 
mystical wholeness in which no individual can be located. He  can answer 
this sort of criticism without much difficulty, as he did in a 1927 reply to  
Santayana's accusation that Dewey has a "tendency to  dissolve the in- 
dividual into his social functions." The reply went, 
But since I find In human Irfe, from its biological roots to its ideal flowers and fruits, 
things both individual and associational-each word being adjectival-I hold that 
nature has both an ~rreducible brute unique "itselfness" in everything which exists and 
also a connection of each thing (which is just what it is) with other things such that 
w~thout  them it "can neither be nor be conceived." And as far as I can follow the 
findings of physics, that conclus~on is confirmed by the results of the exammation of 
physical existence itself. Since experience is both individualized and assoc~ational and 
since experience is continuous with nature as background, as a naturalist I find nature is 
also both. . . . If, perchance, I have exaggerated by my manner of speech the associated 
aspects of experience, it is because the traditional theory of experience dominated by a 
false psychology (as the traditional view of nature wh~ch Santayana reflects is 
dominated by a false physics) has ignored and denied that phase, assuming, as Mr. 
Santayana appears to do, a sole and lonely here and now.' 
Although Arthur F. Bentley might object to this statement a s  ex- 
pressing what he calls the interactional view in contrast to what he wants to 
call the transactional,Wewey's position on entities as separate existences is 
not confused, I think, by this recognition of common-sense individuals. 
But to  revert to the opening remark to  the effect that Dewey never 
satisfactorily worked out the concept of the human individual, it seems to 
me that he was recognizing this unfinished business when, in the 1939 
Schilpp volume on Dewey, he  admitted to Gordon Allport's charge that he 
had not worked out a theory of personality. There is a certain poignancy in 
that admission, because Dewey was there owning t o  a long-standing 
problem with an  awareness that gained little from Allport's criticism. 
Dewey said, 
Returning not+* to ~pecific r~ticisms of Dr. Allport, I am obliged to admit what he Tays 
about the absence of an adequate theory of personality. In a deslre to cut loose from the 
influence of older "spir~tual~st~c" theorles about the nature of the unity and stability of 
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the personal self (regarded as a peculiar k ~ n d  of  substantial-stuff), I faded to show how 
natural condrtions provide support for integrated and potent~ally equilibrated per- 
sonalrty-patterns. . . . Dr. Allport criticizes my writings in the f~eld where the 
psychology of persons in their social (inter-personal) relat~ons is peculiarly weighty, on 
the ground that 1 have failed to show the compatrbility of a community of integrated 
persons with the variety of segmental types of publics wh~ch are due to spec~alizat~on f
werests  and divisions of labor. I certainly admit that at the present time the problem is 
unsolved, and would go so far as to Fay that as  a practical problem it is [he problem of 
our day and generat~on.' 
Dewey again referred to this failing a few years later in his 
correspondence with Bentley, when he said, "I still have to get 
systematically the matter of 'persons' as a social term instead of [their 
being] set over against 'social.' " 6  And earlier in that correspondence, he 
had referred to what he called "some notes entitled 'Persons and Things' 
[to the effect that] normal human beings have certain distinctive properties, 
and the distinction between person and thing is a highly important social- 
behavioral distinction."' In a letter dated ten days later, he expanded on 
that reference by adding, "I have written chapters on 'Persons and Things' 
and on 'mind and matter,' but [I] started all over again last fall, and haven't 
got back to those topics yet."8 
I have made use of an item headed "Chapter IX Things and Persons," 
an unpublished, very rough typescript in the Morris Library of Southern 
Illinois Uni~ers i ty .~  I assume that these are the notes (or chapter) to which 
Dewey referred, but I have not found any record of the new start he 
mentions. At any rate, this typescript contains the basis for a concept of 
person that seems a major step in the direction of that systematic account 
Dewey wanted to develop and thus an important step toward an analysis of 
the problem of the individual that so haunts this century. 
At the time he wrote the article on "Self" mentioned in the opening 
of this paper, he also wrote an article on "Personality," in which he 
stated an approximation to the idea he was working on in "Things and 
Persons." In 1913, he said: 
Personality is closely allied with the conceptions of individuality and selfhood. 
Taken literally, i t  means the state or  quality of being a person. The concept of 
person arose in connection with Roman law. T o  be a person was to be a subject of 
legal rights and responsibihties; that is, of powers and dutres capable of enforcement 
by civil authority. On this view, a corporation or minor civic group, likely a 
munic~pality, was a person; slaves were not persons, wh~le mlnors were persons only 
vicariously, or through their authorized representatives. As the external traits of this 
legal view disappeared, an ethical sense developed out of them; a person is the 
subject of moral rights and d u t i e ~ . ' ~  
And a little farther on, he added, "Individuality expresses what one 
uniquely is; personality expresses what one has-a property that one may 
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acquire." This is as much as he said at that point by way of definition of 
person, and he concluded the article with the remark, "With the develop- 
ment of the democratic idea, rights of personality were extended to 
children, and methods of education have accordingly undergone consider- 
able reconstruction. No consistent theory upon this point has, however, as 
yet, been worked out in practice." 
On the other hand, he was more specific about a self. In the article on 
that topic, he characteristically spelled out the meaning of self in terms of 
biological, psychological, and social capacities: first, the capacity to feel, 
especially to feel pleasure and pain; second, the capacity to recollect 
feelings, to connect them with objects, to make those objects ends of an- 
ticipation, desire, and aversion, and to integrate experiences on the basis of 
their felt qualities; and third, the capacity to distinguish the self from other 
selves as a result of becoming an integral yet distinct member of an 
association." The biological base and the psychological manifestation 
obviously develop into a self only in association with already functioning 
selves. These capacities are discussed and expanded upon in a range of 
Dewey's works, though later he is more likely to refer to behaviors than to 
capacities. 
In "Things and Persons," Dewey shows how any living creature is 
discriminated as individual by means of observation of its behavior. In line 
with his reply to Santayana, Dewey points out that, in vital behavior of an 
animal, generic traits are found in integral association with individual traits. 
"Sheep are sheep and dogs are dogs," he says, "But shepherds know the 
several members of their flocks in their severality; they can tell them 'apart,' 
i.e. indi~idually." '~ "Individual," he says, is an adjectival term derived 
from adverbial force and function. Different qualities in ways of behaving 
in connection with one another are the basis on which the shepherd 
distinguishes his sheep; that is, their individualities emerge only in their 
association. They are distinguished as sheep (in contrast to goats) on the 
basis of a general hereditary continuity of behavior; they are distinguished 
as individual sheep on the basis of particular historical continuities of 
behavior. Again, "individual" is an adjective describing a particular serial 
history of behavior of any living creature; and what is described is an ob- 
servable uniqueness of behavior within an association. A human infant is 
individualized in the observation and description of its parent in the same 
way in which the shepherd individualizes his sheep. 
The distinction of a self requires something more by way of difference 
in behavior, of course. In the paper I am using, however, Dewey moves 
from discrimination of any organism to that of a person. But to be con- 
sistent with what I take him to intend by "person," the argument should go 
from any individual to self and only then to person. The observable 
behavior that would serve to distinguish a self from an organism that is not 
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a self would be just those behaviors that mark what is seen usually as the  
normal growth of a human infant. An infant is most markedly an  in- 
dividual to its parents, but the infant only at a later stage of development 
evinces behaviors that enable a n  impartial observer to detect a self, 
behaviors that demonstrate in interaction with other selves an awareness of 
the self as distinct from those others. The important difference between a 
thing and a self is that ,  unlike a plant o r  most lower animals, the in- 
dividualization of a self, as both Mead and Dewey point out ,  is not merely 
individualization in the observation and description of another but also 
individualization of the self by the self. 
Dewey discusses an aspect of this self-distinction in Human Nature 
and Conduct, where he describes individual mind as constituted of those 
elements of a problematic situation that cluster about a desire for 
reconstruction of that situation but that are rejected by the situation a t  
the moment." Those elements and that desire then are felt t o  belong to  
the self in partial and perhaps temporary, perhaps long-term opposition 
to the environment. Thus one's uniqueness as individual mind does set 
the individual self off from the environment, from society. The self must 
distinguish itself also by observation of its own behavior in some 
association. And cultural conditions determine whether subjective or  
objective distinctions dominate the self's awareness of itself. 
The key to  the distinction between self and person that I want to draw 
appears to be the legal origin of person that Dewey referred to in the 1913 
article. That reference reappears in the letter to Bentley first mentioned, 
although Dewey did not make Iegal status a difference between self and 
person. What he said there is: 
As I've suggested before, if 1 knew more law, I could d o  a better job. You wouldn't 
object, I take [I[], to the fact that certaln business men are insurance agents and others 
are agents wlth respect to other humans who are "principals." Of course, the word 
"agents" and action in connection with them is subject to misuse and, even if r~ghtly 
used, to misunderstanding by readers. What I \rant to d o  1s in effect to  interpret the 
uords "self," "person," etc., In terms analogous to the social-behavloral use of 
"agent" in such casec as I've mentioned." 
What turns out to be crucial in this connection of person with agent is 
the representative character of relationships designated as personal. In 
"Things and Persons," Dewey's genetic method pushes him back to the 
original Latin meaning of persona to show how "person" developed from 
the theatrical term for mask, in order to emphasize this representative 
character. The actor represents a character in a play, as Dewey says, "not 
merely before an audience but to them in a social exchange, receiving some 
sort of reward in return for services rendered."'s Here, I would say, it is 
important to note, in addition to the representative role of the actor, the 
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reciprocal relation of actor to audience, a reciprocity that must, by virtue of 
the representative role of the actor, be an exchange of goods different in 
kind. The audience is not in a position to play a representative role to the 
actor in return for the actor's role. 
As the next step, the use of "person" in Roman law (mentioned in 
the 1913 article) then carried the representative and reciprocal meanings 
of the term outside the theater into the civic arena. I interpret Dewey's 
intention here as implying that the moral meaning that emerged from the 
legal meaning of "person" carried those same characters with it; but it 
seems necessary to note that, with the inordinate emphasis on the sub- 
jective self brought about by recent religious and industrial develop- 
ments, the representative and reciprocal nature of personality has become 
more and more obscure; and "person" has tended to merge with 
"selfv-the great and crescive self of Emerson-the self that presents 
itself as existing in terrible isolation. 
Dewey shows, in typical fashion, in this typescript, how the current 
notions of self derive from the Greek and Christian idea of a 
metaphysical spiritual entity, transformed successively and cumularively 
in Western thought into the self as knower (thus in opposition to the 
object as known), the self as separate moral agent (thus in opposition to 
society), and the self as private and exclusive consciousness (thus in 
opposition to the entire rest of the universe). In contrast to this line of 
development, he argues, again typically, that the idea of personal selves 
is to be verified in actual observations, not in any metaphysical, 
epistemological, political, or psychological theory used to explain ex- 
perience. '' 
The starting point of such verification is, as usual, the behavior of 
organisms in interaction with an environment. And this is the point in 
"Things and Persons" at which he takes up the process of discriminating 
any individual creature, which I spoke of before, and then moves to the 
process of discriminating persons. He points out that individuality can be 
characterized by the adjective "personal" only as the behavior of the 
organism is modified by cultural-social conditions. He gives as evidence 
of the strictly cultural status of personality the ruling by the U.S. 
Supreme Court that a corporation is a person. We cannot make sense of 
such a ruling under the old mentalistic-spiritualistic conception of per- 
sonality, since corporations do not have souls. Thus, Dewey claims, we 
are forced to go back to the etymology of persona, as previously 
mentioned, in order to detect how the Court could arrive at its use of 
c 'per~on." '7 
The argument he offers is that organic behavior is transformed into 
personal behavior in the same manner as sounds are transformed into 
meanings in virtue of their representative function. "For when sounds 
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become words," he writes, "the original qualities of the sounds (or 
marks on paper) are completely subordinated to the meanings they bear, 
the meanings being themselves derived in the process of communication 
from the way they operate and the results they effect in maintaining and 
promoting conjoint or shared activities, whether cooperative or com- 
petitive."" Organic behavior similarly becomes personal in the process of 
certain kinds of cultural interactions-specifically, cultural interactions 
that involve representative roles. Dewey says, 
The cases previously cited of speclfic representatlve function in human assoclatlon, 
such as authorzed agents, priests, tru$tees, elected representatives In law-making 
bodies, guardians, are cases directly in point. To possess and exercise an office I S  to 
be representatlve and the history of the development of offices, or representative 
functions, is the history of transformation of biological traits into traits constituting 
 person^."'^ 
This statement makes clear what Dewey meant in the 1913 article when he 
said that personality is something acquired-as an office is acquired. 
It is in connection with tracing the history of that transformation that 
the significance of law for the concept of person becomes evident. A 
biological function such as care for offspring becomes a personal function 
only as "something of the nature of responsibility for performance of the 
functions comes into existence on the part of progenitors and something of 
the nature of a right to  protection and nurture on the part of offspring. Then 
the execution of a biological function becomes an office, and an office takes 
on rudimentary moral quality."20 This personal quality of a function seems 
to evolve, for Dewey, from the biological function in three stages: first, that 
of customary expectations in primitive social groups, loosely enforced by 
signs of approval or disapproval; second, that of habitual demands (that I 
would call traditional as distinct from customary) that are more overtly 
enforced by social pressures; and third, that of legal regulations, 
authoritatively e n f o r ~ e d . ~ '  In the process of this development, duty 
becomes, as Dewey says, an inward disposition as well as a social ex- 
pectation. 
I take it that, as usually is the case in such an evolution, Dewey intends 
us to understand that customs and traditions remain as ground for overt 
legal regulation. If so, then the breakdown of custom and tradition in the 
face of the advances of science and technology and the resultant far- 
reaching social changes relate directly to the reIative ineffectiveness of law. 
But another factor, from the individual side, in light of this analysis of the 
evolution of personality, is that, while the legal nature of personality still is 
a fact, the individuals who think of themselves as subjective selves rather 
than as what Dewey calls personal selves do not appreciate that fact. 
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As I keep mentioning, Dewey nowhere, so far as I know, distinguishes 
self and person directly. In  fact he  uses "self" and "person" in- 
terchangeably through most of this paper. But folloiving his argument that 
persons and things develop out of a common emotional material-an 
argument directed primarily against his old enemies, the notions that 
sensations are passively received and that sensations are originally singular 
and simple-he makes a distinction between "person" and "man" that 
seems to  me to be based on a difference that holds between a self and a 
person and that is implied in his use of the term "personal self." H e  says, 
"person" stands for something more than "man" does; ~t stand$ for tnan plus a 
special representatlve power that has evolved in soc~a l  groups In wh~ch  jural relat~ons 
have recelved a fa~r ly  h ~ g h  degree o r  erlunclatlon. Perhap? the fact that In most 
modern socletles "voter" has meant more than "c~ t~zen ,"  just as c~tizen has a fuller 
meanlng than allen, may suggest the Lmd of  d~fference. Slmllarly a person must be a 
human being, a man or woman, but must also posse5c a d d ~ t ~ o n a l  capac~ties that ekist 
(operate) only In a group in wh~ch  there evst  such relational funct~ons as formulated 
l iab~li t~es,  r~gh ts ,  duties, and immunit~es." 
Using a different terminology, he  had made much this same distinction 
a few years before in Experience and Education, when he  said, "the 
authority in question [of a parent] when exercised in a well-regulated 
household or other community group is not a manifestation of merely 
personal will; the parent or  teacher exercises it as the representative and 
agent of the interests of the group as a whole."?' The use of "personal" as 
opposed to  "representative" marks this passage as prior to "Things and 
Persons" and will be referred to later. 
Dewey's definition of a person in his typescript amounts to this: a 
person is a human being or  self functioning in a human association in a 
representative capacity in such a way as to  acquire recognized rights and 
duties growing out of that representative activity. If we take this notion of 
6 l person" and look back at Dewey's characterization of a self, I think it is 
possible to see that a child, for instance, can have the capacities Dewey set 
down for a self, can be integrated into an association involving rights and 
duties, without yet being represenfafive of the association o r  of any of its 
other members. And whiIe the child will have legally-recognized rights 
growing out of the offices of parents or guardians, the child ha5 no office, is 
not yet a person. It is only in light of some such distinction as this that 
"self" and "person" d o  not merge in meaning. It seems obvious that a 
child or  a retarded adult o r  even possibly an exotically-trained chimpanzee 
can fulfill Dewey's three criteria for a self without being a person, simply 
because the self concerned has n o  representative role. 
The distinction Dewey made in the passage cited from Experience and 
Education between personal and representative functions of a parent 
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would, with the later terminology, become a distinction between individual 
and personal functions. The control a parent rightfully exercises over a 
chiId is a personal control, as representative of those interests of the child, 
the family, and the community that the child cannot yet represent. The 
parent who controls a child merely from the individual perspective of the 
parent may be trying to shape the child's behavior so that it reflects credit 
on the parent o r  so that it does not inconvenience the parent, but the parent 
is not behaving as a person in that relation. In the  same way, a teacher who 
simply keeps order in a class and imposes an  official lesson plan on the 
students in a11 probability is behaving as an individual who happens to be 
hired as a teacher. A teacher as person will teach as a representative of  the 
values of the community and the interests of the students and the school, 
not as an  individual trying to  maximize his or  her status, income, or  
comfort. 
One's uniqueness as individual mind does set his self off from the 
environment, as I said above. But personality, in Dewey's sense, does not 
set one over against the community; rather it invoIves one necessarily with 
some community. No one can be a person except as he enters into a social 
process as a representative of other persons or a group. In other words, the  
individual considered as a separate entity could have no personal being and 
could not act in the moral sense of that word, but only could respond to the 
social process without being integral with it or  i t  with him. Dewey's often 
repeated statement that genuine duties are not externally imposed but are  
conditions of the activities in which we are involved then means that those 
activities, and hence those duties, are ours only as we enter them in a 
representative capacity, hence as essentially constituted in our behavior by 
relations to  others. 
Persons are not thereby dissolved into their social functions, as San- 
tayana says of Dewey's individuals. (Obviously, individuals, in Dewey's use 
o f  that term, by definition are not dissolved into anything else.) Persons are 
distinguished from the social processes in which they operate because they 
play varying and distinguishing roles. There were no persons in monolithic 
tribal cultures just because there were no such distinguishabIe roles. Dewey 
is concerned to assert of persons, in "Things and Persons," that they are 
objects just as trees and fishes are objects and that persons are distinguished 
as objects in the world that manifest distinctive kinds of behavior in the 
world, just as trees and fishes are. In his discussion of corporate personality 
in Philosophy and Civili~ation in 1931, he used the language of his later 
definition of person t o  make his point: 
the right-and-duty-bearlng unit, or subject, signifies whatever has corigequences of a 
specifled kind. The reason that molecules or trees are not jurldlcal "subjects" 1s then 
clear; they do not display the spectfled consequencer. The deflnlt~on of a legal subject ~s 
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thus a legitimate, and quite conceivably a practically important matter. But it 1s a matter 
of analys~s of facts, not of search for an inhering essence. The facts in question are 
whatever specific consequences flow from being rlght-and-duty-bearing units. . . . The 
consequences must be social In character, and they must besuch social consequences as 
are controlled and modifled by being the bearing of rights and obligations, privileges 
and immunities. Molecules and trees certa~nly have social consequences; but theze 
consequences are what they are irrespective of their having rlghts and duties." 
Those rights and duties define a person, whether an organism or  a cor- 
poration, and consequences that turn on rights and duties mark the 
behavior in the world that distinguishes persons from things-and from 
mere selves without offices. 
Selves have functions, of course. It is only in the most extreme 
pathological case that a self exists simply a s  private. But selves without 
office function as functionaries, as worker ants function in an ant  colony o r  
as assembly-line workers function in an industrial plant. This distinction 
would seem to be what Emerson intended by his distinction between being a 
worker and being man working. A worker is a functionary, the finger o r  
thumb the economic system turns a man into. Man  working has an office 
and thus can function, not as a thumb, but as a p e r ~ o n . ~ ~  
Previous theory, Dewey points out, inverted the actual order of 
relations, holding that moral relations exist because humans are intrinsically 
persons; whereas what actually occurs is that humans become persons with 
the rise of offices having moral qualities. Just as certain acts become virtues 
because of the favorable responses they habitualIy evoke in others, so 
humans become persons because of "pressures, influences, and com- 
mendations occurring in group and communal life." He sums up this point 
by saying, 
I t  15 In and because of Interplay among expectations, demands, fulfillments and 
evasions, w ~ t h  accompanying praise and blame, reward and penalty, approval and 
dl\approval, that modes of behav~or take on acknouledged soc~al  importance and 
become representative of soclal va1ue.j; that 15 ,  of activltles which are taken by the 
group f o  be important for group welfare and perpetuation. Human beings, as the 
bearers of these representative functions, or off~ces,  come into possession of the 
propertres that detcribe a personol b e ~ n g . ' ~  
This notion of person, as essentially tied to office, seems to me to go a 
step beyond Mead's idea of "taking the role of the other."" Being a 
representative of others is something more than thinking oneself in the 
others' places for the purpose of directing one's own actions in relation to 
them or  to some common end. The player on a team, in Dewey's sense, 
represents the whole team from his particular (individualized) position 
insofar as he is a team player (or person) rather than a "star" (or individual 
self) using the team for his individual aggrandizement. A player on a high 
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school team, for example, may represent, in his play, the team, which, in 
turn,  may represent the school and the village o r  town and even, under 
certain conditions of competition, the state or  the nation. In such a process, 
the team members can be observed to  emerge more and more strongly as 
personages within their expanding social contexts and for the duration of  
their team membership. 
Mead's account of the genesis of a self is a sophisticated analysis o f  the 
emergence of the third capacity Dewey named as characterizing a self.*8 
And although Mead's terminology sometimes comes close to  Dewey's 
formulation of what constitutes a person, I d o  not see that Mead actually 
makes the connection t o  office that Dewey does here. In fact, Mead uses 
"personaI" in Mind, S e y a n d  Society as synonymous with "individual" in 
most places, and on occasion uses it t o  mean that which is explicitly 
asocial.*' Even Mead's idea of the generalized other is developed in terms of 
taking the attitude of the whole community. The player on a team takes the 
attitude of  the whole team and thus is able to act intelligently and efficiently 
in relation to the rest of the team. This kind of attitude constitutes the 
intelligence required for a self. But Dewey's concept of a person involves 
more than taking the attitude of another or  even of the entire community. Ir 
involves representing that other o r  community, literally acting for the other. 
To  say that one  must take the attitude of the other in order to represent that 
other is to say that one  must be a self in order to become a person. T o  act 
f o r  another requires having a sense of the stance of that other but also 
having a sense of the interests of that other in a broader perspective than the 
individual or group stance. Needless to  say, while all players are selves, few 
are persons as team members-a fact overtly attested to  by any number of 
professional athletes of our day. 
The practical problem Dewey called the problem of our day and 
generation in his reply to Allport is at least clarified by some of the im- 
plications of this idea of person. That problem was the one of how highly 
individualized and specialized selves can compose a community. If we admit 
that behaving organisms are gradually (not all at once) transformed into 
selves, then there must be degrees of selfhood, as we can observe in the 
maturation of a child. Likewise, if selves are gradually (not all at once) 
tranformed into persons, there must be degrees of personality, a fact we 
need to observe in the maturation process. If, in addition, we admit that 
selves d o  not act in the sense in which only agents can act, then, it is seen 
that the actualization of community depends upon the emergence of in- 
creasingly representative activities on the part of individuals. Individuality, 
for observers, as Dewey has shown, is distinguished by publicly observable 
behavior in the case of  organisms, selves, and persons alike. Individuality 
recognized by the observed form does not exist for mere things. For a self, 
its individuality is observed both by the same sort of observation of 
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behavior in the environment as other observers use and by observations of 
those subjective elements and desires that have n o  place in the environment 
and so  individualize the self as in opposition to the environment. A person, 
in turn,  distinguishes his personal individuality by observation of his of-  
ficial (hence necessarily public and communal) functions and is dis- 
tinguished by others in the same fashion. 
T o  go back to the assumptions just made, I think, first, that the 
evidence for the gradual (not abrupt) transformation of organisms into 
selves and of selves into persons is the body of evidence in the sciences for 
interconnection and continuity in general-evidence such as that for fields 
in physics, child development in psychology, and evolution in biology. 
Second, and as a bare sketch, only agents act because action is a particular 
kind of social process involving communication, which in turn depends 
upon shared values. As Plato says about writing, in the Phaednrs, and 
demonstrates about conversation, in all the dialogues, there is no com- 
munication without a common purpose. Acting is the process of making 
real in the world something that was real only in idea or ideal. And while we 
still may think of ideas as private, when we recognize their linguistic and 
social nature, we see that ideas are shared values if they are realizable. 
Private ideas are precisely those elements rejecfed by the world. Ideals that 
are not private pipe dreams are ideas that, while never realized fully, are 
capable of approximate realization as shared values. Thus,  to act to realize 
an idea is to represent some group constituted by communication. A self 
conceived of as private does not act; it only responds, as Mead's dogs in a 
dog fight respond to signals, no  matter how much more sophisticated may 
be that self's responses. Again, Plato shows this point with his distinction 
between an art and a knack, in the Gorgius. Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles 
are successful in Athenian society by a knack, a cleverness in responding to 
signals. Callicles, as a politician, cannot represent the Athenian demos, 
because he shares n o  values with it; he can only respond to its signals to  try 
to stay in its favor. His behavior can only produce disorder in himself and in 
the dernos, with results no  one can predict, because disorder is random. 
It also occurs to me that Elijah Jordan,  in his book The Good Life, was 
getting at this notion of person when he said that the individual does not 
act, only institutions act.'' We can interpret that rather startling statement, 
I think, to  mean that the mere individual self does not act, only persons act, 
through offices; and offices are instituted in the culture. 
Let me use a social phenomenon of our day to illustrate further the use 
of the idea of person as representative. Dewey remarks that we discriminate 
males from females on the basis of qualities of their behavior. He adds that 
figure or  physique serves for purposes of discrimination because bodily 
structures are connected with specifiable modes of inter-activity. Thus we 
can say that female persons are distinguished by their sexually different 
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representative roles from male persons. Where there is no  sexual difference 
in representative roles, persons d o  not differ as male and female but as 
individuals. The office of a mother is distinct from that of a father, but a 
female should be able to acquire any office of which she is capable, so long 
as it it; compatible with any sexually-related office she assumes. And the 
same should be said of a male. Once more, Plato foreshadows this view. In 
his major psychological dialogue, the Republic, he argues that the only 
sexually-related roles in his city built of words are those of bearing a n d  
nursing children, on one hand, and of siring them, on the other. All other 
roles are to be acquired by ability without regard to  sex. This most radical 
of views for an Athenian reflects Plato's sense that women could not 
become persons except as they could hold offices. That sense is borne out by 
the debates in pagan and Christian literature (which Dewey mentions) as to  
whether women had souls and so whether they were persons." The offices 
that constitute persons must be recognized as such in the social context; 
and,  so long as the roles permitted to women were considered trivial or non- 
existent, women were not persons, except in extraordinary circumstances, 
such as those of queens and priestesses. 
Closer to  our own time, women have begun to fight to become 
persons, and that fight has become more and more open and organized. 
The maiden aunt in New England had to strive desperately on her own 
for some small role in relations with her parents and nephews and nieces. 
Emily Dickinson, with no office, retired into her house and created an 
office by becoming a representative of humankind in her poetry. Virginia 
Woolf expressed a fleeting sense of this office in A Writer's Diary when 
she said: "I thought, driving through Richmond last night, something 
very profound about the synthesis of my being: how only writing 
composes it: how nothing makes a whole unless I am writing: now I have 
forgotten what seemed so p r o f o ~ n d . " ~ '  Male writers, too,  may have only 
a writing office, but generally not because society curs them off from all 
other roles. 
One last example: The individual I think of as the outstanding 
personage of our century is Eleanor Roosevelt, and I think i t  b e c a ~ ~ s e  he 
struggled, against formidable barriers erected by her family and her 
society, to transform herself into a person by acquiring, on her own, 
offices of worldwide scope-not legally authorized offices, but moral 
offices of an effectiveness and authority that could not be ignored. 
Eleanor Roosevelt is still being vilified, but she was not trapped by her 
femaleness nor was she a lost individual, because she became, for people 
throughout the world, the representative of the poor, the maligned, the 
oppressed. 
The lost individual, to return from these by-ways, is an individual 
arrested in its development at a stage of selfhood in which its behavior is 
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dominated by its subjective distinctions. The only way in which that 
individual will be found or  located is by evolving beyond that truncated 
sense of selfhood, through a recovery o f  the sense of  the public 
dimension o f  selfhood, to the emergence of personality, which will be 
realized in and through the individual's behavior as communal. 
Integration into a community of the individual as individual is made 
possible by the attainment o f  personhood on the part of the individual. 
That  attainment may be of a relatively unconscious habit of  represen- 
tative behavior or  of a highly conscious one. Social organizations of the 
past served individuals in them by inculcating such representative habits, 
frequently without explicit awareness of them. The family, when it was 
an economic rather than a dormitory unit, built into the children in it a 
sense of their function, which could rather easily evolve into a sense of 
office. The child on a family farm, early on ,  knew that the family 
required that a variety of chores be performed. Under the best cir- 
cumstances, those chores were not felt as impositions by parents, even 
when the chores were onerous, but were felt as conditions o f  the family's 
existence. A child so socialized could mature and move out of the family 
into the larger community, carrying that sense of office in such a way 
that it grew with relative ease from narrower to wider offices. 
Existing institutions, by and large, n o  longer succeed in socializing 
their members into persons. One function after another has been 
removed from the family into specialized corporate units-education, 
religion, economic production; and those units have prospered by 
specializing individuals, even by mechanizing them for the sake of 
technical efficiency. For the economic system or the education system to 
serve human ends rather than its otvn ends, that system wilI have to be 
reconstructed so as to produce persons and reward them as persons. 
Before such a reconstruction is so much as possible, individuals will have 
to come to understand the facts and the potentialities of their present 
problematic situation. Dewey's concept of person, more fully worked 
out,  strikes me as a potentially valuable instrument for the assessment of 
our plight. 
Many of our corporations actively discourage agency in their 
members by their ruthless attitudes toward individuals in them. An in- 
dividual cannot in his behavior become truly representative of a cor- 
poration that may fire him or  shunt him aside at  any time. Some 
Japanese corporations have avoided this particular organizational 
weakness, but at the cost of a paternalism that has its owrn deper- 
sonalizing consequences. 
Even before they move into corporations, we make it difficult for 
our  children ever to become persons, because we educate them in no 
offices. Their function as children is to learn, but that learning is so cut 
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o f f  from the society that it cannot constitute an office. We make it 
impossible for the elderly to remain persons, because we turn them out 
of  any offices they may have had. Their function is to be retired, and 
that is as nonsensical a notion as any culture has concocted. 
What Dewey saw as the problem remains our problem. He  stated it 
many times. I will close with a statement from Freedom and Cultul-e in 
which he said: 
lndtv~duals at prerent f ~ n d  themselves in the grlp of Itnrneme forces \\hose work~r i~n  
and consequences they have no power of affect~ng. The situat~on calls ernphatlc 
artentlon to the need for face-to-face associat~oris whose lnreractlons x x i t l ~  one 
another may offset ~f not control the dread impersonality of the sweep of present 
forces. There 1s a dlffererice betneen a soclety, 111 the sense of an assoclatlon, and a 
cornrnunlty Electronc, atoms, and molecules are In association w ~ t h  one another. 
Norti~rig e'c~.;ts In  sola at ion anywhere throughout nature Natural associat~ons are 
cond~tlonr for the eklstence of a comrnunlty, b~l t  a commtlnlty add? the function of 
c o m ~ t ~ u t ~ i c a r ~ o n  In which emotlons and Idea\ are shared as well as  joint undertahlngr 
engaged ~ n . "  
Dewey's last struggle to formulate the meaning of the kind of per- 
sonality that requires and is required by community marks one more legacy 
of this philosopher to those who share his ideal-share that recognition 
which he states in "Things and Persons," "that a// normal human beings 
are persons potentially," a recognition that "is itself the product and mark 
of a great moral advance in the constitution of human ~oc ie ty . "~"  
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